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We agree with Clive Bull's comment on
two points, but take slight issue with him on
a third. We agree that our 1984 paper was
very interesting. We also agree that if workers
are risk averse and if quits could easily be
differentiated from fires, then the firm would
offer unemployment insurance for workers
who quit. Bull's remarks about why such
insurance is not offered in our model, and
regarding the effect of such insurance on
equilibrium, are not quite correct, however.
Because of space limitations, in our earlier
paper we were unable to expand on why we
assumed that firms could not distinguish quits
from fires for the purposes of unemployment
compensation. Neither did we fully describe
the role that this assumption played in our
analysis. In fact, the equilibrium would be
very different if employers could distinguish
between quits and fires. If such distinctions
are possible, and if workers were risk neutral,
employers would shift much of workers'
compensation into severance pay for quitters,
yet provide no more than the legal minimum
of pay (vv) to fired shirkers. This shift would
reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate,
possibly to zero. If workers are risk averse,
however, such compensation shifting would
be limited, and equilibrium unemployment
would persist. In either case. Bull's remark
that employers' ability to distinguish quits
from fires would have "no impact on the
incentive to shirk" is incorrect. In the new
equilibrium we would need to distinguish
VQ, the expected lifetime utility of unem-
ployed workers who had quit their jobs,
and Vf, expected utility for those who were
fired.
In our earlier paper we made the assump-
tion that employers would find it rather dif-
*Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Interna-
tional Affairs, and Department of Economics, respec-
tively, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.
ficult to distinguish between quits and fires.
In particular, it would appear difficult to
prove that a worker shirked, rather than quit,
especially if the differences in payments to
workers in those two groups is large. The
reason we did not permit such distinctions
was that it seemed to us, in general, to be a
reasonably easy matter for either side of the
contract to convert a "fire" into a "quit" and
vice versa.
Assume that a worker receives unemploy-
ment compensation if he quits, but not if he
is fired (in contrast with our public unem-
ployment compensation programs). Then a
worker who has shirked and been caught at
it has an incentive to run to his boss and
announce that he has quit, before he receives
a notice that he is being fired. In practice,
firms frequently give workers who have mis-
behaved a "second chance"; but if the worker
then could announce that he was quitting,
any such second chance would prove costly
to the firm. Similarly, the firm, upon hearing
rumors that, for one reason or another, one
of its employees was contemplating quitting,
would immediately fire him, claiming that he
was shirking.
The costs associated with monitoring
whether a worker had or had not shirked
seem large; and the costs imposed on the
employer, were he required to document
thoroughly every firing, seem sufficiently
great as to make this an unattractive policy.
The considerations that lie behind this dis-
cussion are clearly beyond the scope of the
formal model we developed; and clearly there
are circumstances in which it is possible to
differentiate between quits and fires. Such a
distinction relies upon an outside (third)
party observing workers' effort levels, how-
ever. Our analysis applies to situations (that
are common) in which employers find it hard
to observe effort; third parties will in general
find effort monitoring at least as costly. In
practice, monitoring and "management" or
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"supervision" are joint products, and third-
party monitoring is not observed. Any mod-
eling requires simplification. In our judg-
ment, the assumption that it was impossible
to differentiate between quits and fires
seemed better than the alternative polar as-
sumption.
Bull's point about the importance of firms'
abihties to distinguish quit and fires is legit-
imate. He seems, however, to have missed
one of the two central messages of our paper.
Whether or not one can or cannot dis-
tinguish between quits and fires, the equi-
librium contract is likely not to be con-
strained Pareto efficient.
First, when there is full employment (as in
most of the implicit contract Uterature), the
incentive for providing unemployment in-
surance is that the firm can obtain workers
at lower total expected (present discounted
value of) costs. Here, the firm has no dif-
ficulty obtaining workers: there is a reserve
army of the unemployed. Bull's remarks
about the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between wages, w, and unemploy-
ment compensation, w", reveal that he is
missing this point: workers will trade off w
and w" (i.e., have a negative MRS), while
firms find that a higher w" requires a higher
w; firms have a positive MRS. It is the
differing signs of these MRSs, not the mag-
nitudes, that is the fundamental problem. No
amount of risk aversion will change this sign
pattern. It is for this reason that firms will
provide no more than the legal minimum of
unemployment compensation if they cannot
distinguish quits and fires. In general, there
is no reason to expect the equilibrium rate of
unemployment insurance, so determined, to
be socially optimal. The socially optimal rate
of unemployment benefits balances the in-
surance aspects of such benefits against the
added monitoring costs they necessitate.
Firms, however, do not account for the in-
surance aspects of unemployment benefits
since they have no trouble attracting unem-
ployed workers (especially when such benefits
are low!).
Second, in the case where quits can be
distinguished from fires, the decision to pro-
vide unemployment insurance by one firm
imposes an externality on other firms. This
externahty arises because unemployment in-
surance influences the quit rate, which in
turn affects the turnover rate. Increasing the
turnover rate reduces the expected duration
in the unemployment pool, and hence neces-
sitates an increase in monitoring expenses
and/or wages on the part of other firms to
avoid shirking. This suggests that the firm
may provide too high an unemployment ben-
efit.
The exact balancing of the considerations
that go into determining the socially optimal
level of unemployment compensation is a
complicated matter, which would take us
beyond the scope of this reply. It is clear,
however, that whether firms can or cannot
differentiate between quits and fires, the pro-
vision of unemployment insurance by em-
ployers will not be at a socially optimal level.
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